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ABSTRACT 
 
The Afghan Constitution and the Afghan Criminal Procedure Act 
(“ACPA”) authorize Afghanistan’s President to grant pardons or reduce 
criminal punishment.  However, the Afghan Constitution and ACPA do 
not specify a method or mechanism for how Afghanistan’s President 
may exercise his power.  As a result, Afghanistan’s President has been 
granting pardons through pardon decrees.  The Afghanistan 
Constitution and ACPA’s broad language has allowed corruption and 
enabled the President to undermine the judiciary.  This article 
recommends for Afghanistan’s government to amend its constitution 
and ACPA.  The amendments should formalize and specify the method 
and mechanisms for the President’s pardon power; thereby promoting 
respect for the rule of law and the judiciary.  This article also proposes 
for Afghanistan’s government to establish an independent pardon board 
to review petitions and recommend eligible requests to the President. 
This article suggests that Afghanistan’s pardon procedures 
combine the methods used by Iran and Washington State.  These 
methods are demonstrated in sources such as the Iranian Code, the 
Revised Code of Washington, and the Bylaws of the Washington State 
Clemency and Pardon Board.  This amalgam of approaches would be 
both practical and appropriate for Afghanistan’s socio-political context, 
striking a balance between progressive Western methods and an Islamic 
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Republic’s successful methods.  This article also explains 
Afghanistan’s current laws relating to presidential pardon power and 
exposes how the current system leads to corruption and the pardon’s 
misuse.  Next, the article will discuss how Iran and Washington State 
regulate their pardon power.  In analyzing Iran and Washington State’s 
methods, the article will suggest specific amendments to Afghanistan’s 
laws.  These specific amendments would (1) modify the President’s 
pardon power, (2) limit the scope of this power, (3) establish an 
independent board that restricts the pardon power, and (4) authorize this 
board to recommend pardons or punishment reductions to 
Afghanistan’s President.  Finally, this article will address the potential 
criticisms and challenges to its proposed model, such as limiting the 
presidential and executive power and authority. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Afghanistan’s government has released many criminals convicted 
of various heinous crimes.1  Such release was done through several 
presidential pardon decrees and Afghanistan’s peace agreement with 
Hezb-e-Islami Afghanistan (“HIA”),2 which translates to the 
                                                          
1.  Jawid Hassanzada, 198 Zendani Hezb-i-Isalmi Az Zendan Hai Pul-i-Charkhi 
Wa Bagram Hazad Shodand [198 HIA Prisoners were Released from Afghanistan’s 
Pul-e-Charki and Bagram prisons], AZADIRADIO.COM (June 14, 2018) 
https://da.azadiradio.com/amp/29290406.html  [hereinafter Zendani Hezb-i-Islami].  
2.  Id. 
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Afghanistan Islamic Party.  Undoubtedly, Afghanistan’s government 
released criminals because of its relationship with the HIA or 
individuals who will support President Ashraf Ghani in the next 
election.  For example, President Ghani gave a “full pardon” to HIA’s 
armed group commander, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, and HIA’s so-called 
“criminal members,” who allegedly support President Ghani. 
Hekmatyar and other HIA members allegedly killed many Afghan 
citizens, including Kabul University law professor, Hamida Barmaki, 
her four children, and husband.3 Since then, the Afghan government has 
signed a peace agreement that has pardoned 473 HIA members, 
releasing them from the Pul-e-Charkhi prison, the Bagram prison, and 
other provincial prisons.4  Further, the Afghan government promised to 
release more than 2,500 other HIA prisoners, all of whom were 
allegedly expected to support President Ghani.5  Thus, Afghanistan’s 
President (the “President”) has regularly or usually released many 
convicted prisoners through presidential pardoning decrees at different 
occasions every year.6 
Part I of this article argues that the HIA peace agreement and the 
governing Afghan laws do not adequately define the circumstances 
where the President can legally and morally exercise the pardon power.  
Without specific procedures and mechanisms outlining the President’s 
power, corruption and political abuses will continue, undermining the 
judiciary’s authority to determine punishments for convicted criminals. 
The problems of corruption and political abuses through the 
President’s pardon power are largely attributable to the lack of 
specificity in Afghanistan’s pardon procedures.  In particular, 
Afghanistan’s Constitution and the Afghan Criminal Procedure Act 
                                                          
3.  Anisa Shahid, Khanawad Hai Qurbaneyan Hamla Hai Hezb-i-Islami Az 
Hokomat Adalat Mekhahand [The Families of the Victims of the Hizb-i-Islami 
Attacks Demand Justice], TOLO NEWS (May 1, 2018) 
https://www.tolonews.com/fa/afghanistan/هداوناخ%E2%80%8C اھی-نابرقینا-
ھلمح%E2%80%8C اھی-بزح-ملاسای-زا-تموکح-تلادع-می %E2%80%8Cدنھاوخ. 
4.  Zendani Hezb-i-Islami, supra note 1. 
5.  See 260 Zendani Hezb-i-Islami Hekmatyar Az Zendan Hazad Shodand [260 
HIA prisoners were released from Prison], ETILAATROZ.COM (June 14, 2018) 
https://www.etilaatroz.com/62014/ 
6.  QANUNI EJRAATI JAZAI [CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ACT], THE OFFICIAL 
GAZETTE OF AFGHANISTAN 1132, 1393 [2014], art. 354 [hereinafter 2014 Criminal 
Procedure Act]. 
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(“ACPA”) authorize the President to reduce sentences or pardon 
convictions.7  However, the language in both sources are broad, failing 
to specify the method, procedures, or mechanisms for the President to 
exercise his pardon power.8  As a result, the President has been 
unrestrained in using presidential decrees for granting pardons or 
reducing sentences.  The discretionary nature of this pardon power and 
process can lead to corruption, which enables circumvention of 
accountability and encroaches on judicial power.  To address this 
problem, this article recommends for Afghanistan to amend its 
constitution and ACPA.  The amendments would emulate jurisdictions 
where clemency statutes and rules are clear, which would effectively 
prevent corruption and political abuse. 
Part II of this article suggests that Afghanistan’s pardon procedures 
combine the methods used by Iran and Washington State.  These 
methods are demonstrated in sources such as the Iranian Code, the 
Revised Code of Washington, and the Bylaws of the Washington State 
Clemency and Pardon Board.  This amalgam of approaches would be 
both practical and appropriate for Afghanistan’s socio-political context, 
striking a balance between progressive Western methods and an Islamic 
Republic’s successful methods.  Iran and Washington State’s methods 
are good examples because they are aligned with international 
standards of good governance. 
In Iran, pardon requests are reviewed by a five-judge committee in 
Tehran and a provincial committee in each province.9  If either 
committee approves a request finding the applicant eligible, then the 
pardon is proposed for confirmation from the Supreme Court to the 
Islamic Revolution Leader, Rabar-e Enqelab Islami.10  Specifically, the 
respective committee first examines all of the documents contained in 
                                                          
7.  QANUNI ASSASI AFGHANISTAN [THE CONSTITUTION OF AFGHANISTAN], THE 
OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF AFGHANISTAN 818, 1383 [2004], art. 64 § 18.  A pardon 
forgives a defendant of a crime, while commutation reduces a defendant’s sentence. 
BRYAN A. GARNER, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1286-87 (10th ed. 2014). 
8.  See QANUNI ASSASI AFGHANISTAN [THE CONSTITUTION OF AFGHANISTAN], 
THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF AFGHANISTAN 818, 1383 [2004], art. 64 § 18; see also 
2014 Criminal Procedure Act supra note 6, art. 348.  
9.  Hahin Namae  Kamesyoun Haf wa Takhfif Majazat Makumen [Regulation 
of the Pardoning and Reducing the Punishment of Convicts] Tehran 1387 [2008] 
(Iran) arts. 2-4. [hereinafter 2008 Iranian Pardoning Regulation]. 
10.  Id. art. 15. 
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the petition to pardon or reduce punishment.11  During this stage, the 
committee must determine whether the petitioner has been 
rehabilitated, and whether the pardon or punishment reduction is 
beneficial for society and the government.12  Then, the Supreme Court 
supervises, provides oversight, and prevents further injustice.13 
Like Iran, Washington State follows procedures that add structural 
safeguards to the pardon process.  There, the Clemency and Pardon 
Board hears a petitioner in a regular or special hearing process before 
recommending a pardon to the Governor.14  This approach works well 
in Washington State because its State Constitution, Revised Code, and 
Clemency and Pardon Board Bylaws use clear language.  Washington’s 
laws clearly define each officials’ authority and responsibilities and 
describe how a convict may seek a pardon or punishment reduction.15 
Similar to Iran’s model, experienced professionals review and consider 
the special circumstances of each Washington State pardon petition.  
These professionals determine whether a convict has been rehabilitated 
and is ready to rejoin the community.16  In addition, Washington State 
publicly reviews pardons and punishment reductions.17  By sharing 
pardon reviews to the public, Washington State reinforces the finding’s 
accountability and reliability, promotes transparency, and prevents 
corruption. 
Pardon procedures should include characteristics from Iran and 
Washington State’s models.  This article emphasizes that Afghanistan 
should carefully protect judiciary independence by incorporating Iran 
and Washington’s procedures, which avoids undermining judicial 
decisions. 
                                                          
11.  2008 Iranian Pardoning Regulation, supra note 9, art. 2,4,15 
12.  Id. art. 24. 
13.  Id. art. 30. 
14.  CLEMENCY AND PARDONS BOARD, BYLAWS OF THE WASHINGTON STATE 
CLEMENCY AND PARDONS BOARD, arts. 1 §1.02, 3 § 3.01-3.02 (Mar. 22, 2011).  
15.  Id. art. 2 §2.05-2.07. 
16.  2008 Iranian Pardoning Regulation, supra note 9, art. 2 
17.  STATE OF WASHINGTON OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR, Washington State 
Clemency & Pardons Board Policies 3 (2012) at 5. 
https://www.digitalarchives.wa.gov/GovernorGregoire/clemency/documents/policie
s.pdf. [hereinafter Washington Clemency & Pardons Board Policies]; Bylaws of 
Clemency and Pardons Board, supra note 14, at art. 3 § 3.01.   
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To support this claim, this article describes Afghanistan’s current 
pardon laws and procedures, and describes how corruption leads to 
misuse of pardons.  Then, this article accounts for Afghanistan’s current 
political climate, which includes the tensions caused by the National 
Unity Government, the roles and powers of each branch, and how these 
branches relate to the President’s pardon power.  Next, this article 
explains how the current Afghan regime approaches the pardon 
process; an approach that is susceptible to and has been used to 
perpetuate corruption.  The following sections discuss and compare 
how Iran and Washington State handle the same issues.  Those sections 
will then examine and critique Iran and Washington’s procedures for 
the purpose of determining a legal reform model for Afghanistan. 
Part III of this article also suggests specific amendments to the 
ACPA and Afghanistan’s Constitution.  The amendments specifically 
propose for the creation of explicit provisions that define the President’s 
authority and a statute establishing an independent pardon board and 
process.  Additionally, these amendments would empower a pardoning 
board to promulgate regulations that implement the process.  The 
proposed board would be charged with drafting procedures for issuing 
pardons and reducing sentences.  These procedures should clarify who 
can request the pardons and under which circumstances to approve 
pardons.  Finally, this article will address the potential criticisms and 
challenges to its proposed model, such as limiting the presidential and 
executive power and authority. 
I. UNDERSTANDING THE PRESIDENT’S PARDON POWER IN 
AFGHANISTAN 
A. Peace Agreement with Hezb-e-Islami Afghanistan 
From 2001 to 2016, HIA fought against Afghanistan’s government 
in an armed conflict before reaching a peace agreement.18  During that 
period, Afghanistan’s government negotiated a peace agreement with 
                                                          
18.  Nesar A. Khelwatgar, Dornomai Seyasee Gulbuddin Hekmatyar [Political 
Perspective of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar], SALAM WATANDAR (Dec. 11, 2018) 
https://swn.af/uzbeki/Article.aspx?a=43409; Mohammad Q. Erfani, Sulh Ba 
Hekmatyar Che Tasire Bar Hawzai Afghanistan Gozashta? [How Did Peace with 
Hekmatyar Affect the Situation in Afghanistan?], BBC NEWS (Sept. 3, 2018), 
https://www.bbc.com/persian/amp/afghanistan-45397256. 
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the HIA but failed.19  Surprisingly, after the 2014 election, the armed 
HIA group accepted the peace request and began negotiating with 
Afghanistan’s government.20  In September 2016, after two years of 
negotiation, HIA and Afghanistan’s government finally signed a peace 
agreement.21 
Under Article Five of the Peace Agreement, Afghanistan’s 
government promised to ask the United States and United Nations to 
remove HIA’s leader, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, and other members of his 
party from the international “blacklist” and sanctions list.22  Eight 
months after the Afghan government committed to and signed the 
agreement, Hekmatyar returned to Nangarhar and Kabul.23  Since then, 
Hekmatyar’s political party has participated in preliminary elections 
and Hekmatyar has been preparing to participate in next year’s 
presidential election.24 
In Article Eleven of the peace agreement, Afghanistan’s 
government promised to release only the HIA prisoners “who have not 
committed criminal crimes and there would be no personal claims by 
certain individuals against them.”25F25  However, recent reports show 
Afghanistan’s government released 463 HIA prisoners who were 
                                                          
19.  Aimal Faizi, Afghans Must Support Peace Deal with Hekmatyar, 
ALJAZEERA (Oct. 16, 2016) https://www.aljazeera.com/amp/indepth/opinion/ 
2016/10/afghans-support-peace-deal-hekmatyar-161013141501350.html. 
20.  Hekmatyar to Surface Once Peace Deal is Enforced: HIA, PAJHWOK 
AFGHAN NEWS (Jan. 5, 2017). https://www.pajhwok.com/en/2017/01/05/hekmatyar-
surface-once-peace-deal-enforced-hia. 
21.  Id. 
22.  Id. 
23.  Jennifer Hauser & Ivan Watson, Afghan Warlord Returns to Kabul After 
Nearly 20 Years, CNN (May 9, 2017), https://www.cnn.com/2017/05/04/asia/afghan-
warlord-hekmatyar-returns-to-kabul/index.html.  
24.  Hamed Nazari, Hekmatyar Says His Party Will Elect Next President, TOLO 
NEWS (Aug. 5, 2017), https://www.tolonews.com/index.php/afghanistan/hekmatyar-
says-his-party-will-elect-next-president. 
25.  Mohammad Ameen Karim, Full text of Agreement between the Government 
of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan & Hezb-e-Islami of Afghanistan Led by Gulbuddin 
Hekmatyar, CTR. FOR RES. & SECURITY STUD. (Oct. 5, 2016), 
https://crss.pk/story/full-text-of-agreement-between-the-government-of-islamic-
republic-of-afghanistan-goira-hezb-e-islami-of-afghanistan-led-by-gulbuddin-
hekmatyar/ [hereinafter Full Text of Peace Agreement with HIA]. 
8
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convicted of various crimes.26  Following the prisoners’ release, 
“human rights organizations criticized the government for agreeing to 
the move stating that the political prisoners had been involved in 
insurgency incidents that killed civilians.”27  Throughout the year, the 
President regularly releases convicts through pardon decrees28 without 
applying procedures and examining whether they are no longer a danger 
to society.29 
B. The Legal Landscape of the Pardon Power 
The President’s current pardon power enables corruption because 
his power goes unchecked.  Afghanistan’s Constitution and the ACPA 
fail to adequately describe the methods or mechanisms for issuing 
pardons.30  Article 64 §18 in Afghanistan’s Constitution provides the 
President with pardon power by stating he shall exercise it under the 
law’s provisions.31  The ACPA does not contain any provisions 
specifying the procedure or mechanisms allowing the President to 
implement his pardon power.32  Therefore, this broad language leaves 
the door open for the President to issue pardons without a mechanism 
to check him. 
                                                          
26.  75 Uzwe Hezb-e Islami Hekmatiyar Az Zendan Pul-e Charkhi Hazad 
Shodand [75 members of Hekmatyar’s Islamic Party prisoners were released from 
Pul-e Charkhi Prison], BBC NEWS (Jan. 11, 2018), 
http://www.bbc.com/persian/afghanistan-42634528  
27.  Govt Releases 75 Hizb-e-Islami Prisoners from Kabul Prison, TOLO NEWS 
(Jan. 11, 2018), https://www.tolonews.com/afghanistan/govt-releases-75-hizb-e-
islami-prisoners-kabul-prison.  
28.  The Afghan Criminal Procedure Act authorize the president to grant 
pardons or reduce punishments in 5 specific events, like Independence Day. 
29.  See 2014 Criminal Procedure Act, supra note 6, arts. 348, 354. 
30.  See QANUNI ASSASI AFGHANISTAN [THE CONSTITUTION OF 
AFGHANISTAN], THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF AFGHANISTAN 818, 1383 [2004], art. 64 
§ 18; 2014 Criminal Procedure Act, supra note 6, art. 348.  
31.  See QANUNI ASSASI AFGHANISTAN [THE CONSTITUTION OF 
AFGHANISTAN], THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF AFGHANISTAN 818, 1383 [2004], art. 64 
§ 18. 
32.  See 2014 Criminal Procedure Act, supra note 6, art. 348. 
9
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1. The Pardon Power Under Afghanistan’s Constitution 
Article 64 § 18 in the 2004 Afghanistan Constitution gave the 
President the power to “[r]educe and pardon penalties in accordance 
with the provisions of the law.”33  The vague phrase, “provisions of the 
law” suggests Afghanistan needs to establish a framework to exercise 
the Article 64 §18 authority.  There is still no current statute that 
specifically clarifies or legalizes the implementation of the pardon 
power.  Without clear legal guidance, Afghanistan’s President used 
pardons to release or reduce the punishment of various prisoners 
through presidential pardon decrees, which are usually drafted by the 
ministry of justice.34 
From 2001 to 2004, Afghanistan’s judicial system used the 
Criminal Procedure Act of 1964.35  Then, in 2004, the government 
enacted the Interim Criminal Procedure Act for Courts, using it 
simultaneously with the Criminal Procedure Act of 1964.36  Both had 
loopholes and shortcomings because neither responded to the existing 
problems with the Presidential pardon power.  Additionally, both laws 
did not have clear procedures restricting the President’s power or the 
manner of its exercise.  As a result, the President broadly interpreted 
the Constitution’s Article 64 § 18, using it to implement his pardon 
power through presidential pardon decrees. 
In 2014, the legislature made a few minor changes to the 
President’s pardon power with the ACPA.37  One change slightly 
shortened the list of crimes that would make a criminal eligible for 
pardons or punishment reduction.38  These changes will be further 
discussed below. 
                                                          
33.  See QANUNI ASSASI AFGHANISTAN [THE CONSTITUTION OF 
AFGHANISTAN], THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF AFGHANISTAN 818, 1383 [2004], art. 64 
§ 18. 
34.  Moqarara-e Tanzem Ejraat Wa Fahalit hai Wezart-e-Adlia [Regulation of 
the Procedure and Activities of the Ministry of Justice] 1420/1378 [1999] (Afg.), 
http://moj.gov.af/fa/page/7943/9493. 
35.  See QANUNI EJRAATI JAZAI MOHAQAT BARAI MAHAKEM [INTERIM 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE FOR COURTS] art. 98, THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF 
AFGHANISTAN  820, 1382 [2004] (Afg.). 
36.  See id. 
37.  See 2014 Criminal Procedure Act, supra note 6, arts. 348-354. 
38.  Id. 
10
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2. Pardon Power Under the Afghan Criminal Procedure Act 
ACPA’s Article 348 confirms the President’s pardon power 
through a pardon decree.39  Although ACPA provides the President 
power through presidential decrees, it limits the power’s scope.40  For 
example, ACPA’s Article 350 states the President can no longer issue 
a pardon for all crimes.41 
However, ACPA is flawed, because it does not specify procedural 
mechanisms for the execution of presidential decrees.42  Article 348 
states, “[a] pardon shall be carried out by the decree of the president 
and based on the decree some or all of the final punishments of the 
convicted person shall be dismissed or shall be reduced to a lighter 
punishment as anticipated by the law.”43  These deficiencies exist 
because the legislature lacked experienced drafting specialists, who are 
knowledgeable about drafting effective laws and the legal complexities 
of pardon decree legislation.  Such legal complexities require laws to 
have specific implementation methods.  Further, non-governmental 
organizations generally propose or draft laws, but such organizations 
also lack the institutional knowledge to draft laws that fit Afghanistan.44 
Notably, ACPA grants the President broad authority.  Article 348 
§ 2 states, “[a] pardon shall not dismiss consequential and 
complementary punishments and security measures[,] and 
consequences of criminal charges[;] and does not affect previously 
applied punishments unless the issued pardon decree states 
otherwise.”45  The clause, “unless the issued pardon decree states 
otherwise,” gives the President broad authority to pardon convicted 
criminals or commute sentences that have already been implemented. 
The broad nature of the President’s authority can enable corruption 
and political abuse.  For instance, ACPA authorizes the President to 
                                                          
39.  See 2014 Criminal Procedure Act, supra note 6, art. 348 (1). 
40.  Id. art. 350. 
41.  Id.  
42.  Id. art. 348 § 1. 
43.  Id.  
44.  Qudratullah Ahmadi, , Negai Ba Hamalkard NGO ha Dar Afghanistan [ A 
Look at the Performance of NGOs in Afghanistan], THE DAILY AFG. MA (July 13, 
2011), http://www.dailyafghanistan.com/opinion_detail.php?post_id=121657. 
45.  See 2014 Criminal Procedure Act, supra note 6, art. 348 (2). 
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issue a pardon for “previously applied punishments.”46  During the 
elections this power allows each presidential candidate to make various 
commitments to their followers by pardoning previous violations in 
exchange for votes. 
Despite these flaws, the ACPA limits the President’s pardon power 
through the “preservation of [the] rights of others”47 and the restrictions 
that prevent the President from pardoning specific crimes, like Hudud, 
Qesas, Deyyat,48 intentional murder, kidnapping for ransom, 
administrative corruption, drug trafficking, recitivism, and other crimes 
determined by the President.49  ACPA establishes some exceptions on 
the above restrictions and states the following: 
Commuting the imprisonment punishment of [those convicted]of the 
crimes set forth in subparagraphs (1 and 2) of paragraph (2) . . . may 
be commuted if, in [the crime of] murder, the . . . victim[‘s heirs] 
waive the convict’s punishment, and, in [the crime of] kidnapping, 
the property or benefit obtained is returned to the victim.50 
Moreover, under paragraph 4, the ACPA clarifies paragraph 2 and 
states, “[c]ommuting the punishment of convicts of the crimes set forth 
in paragraph (2) observing the provision of paragraph (3) of this Article 
shall not exceed ¾ of the punishment.”51 
Although the ACPA allows for the pardon or reduction of 
punishment for convicted prisoners, it did not specify a method for the 
President to follow in issuing pardons.52  Similarly, the ACPA created 
another problem by allowing the President to pardon previously-
sanctioned offenses.53  The ACPA states the pardon decree cannot 
affect a past punishment unless otherwise decided by the presidential 
pardon decrees.54 
                                                          
46.  Id. 
47.  Id. art. 349. 
48.  Id. art. 350. The pardon of Deyyat is restricted unless the victim does not 
have an inheritor. 
49.  See id. art 350 §§ 1-2. 
50.   Id. art. 350 § 3. 
51.  Id. art. 350. 
52.  Id. art. 348. 
53.  See id. art. 348. 
54.  See id. 
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This Article raises another issue about the difference between 
“pardon” and “restoring prestige” in the ACPA.  Under ACPA’s article 
352, when an individual requests expungement of his criminal record, 
the “primary court” that first convicted that individual has authority to 
issue an order restoring prestige.55  In contrast, a pardon can dismiss or 
reduce “some or all of the final punishments of the convicted person,” 
which is entirely different from restoring prestige.56 A pardon usually 
affects the current punishment, not the punishment that has already 
been implemented.  By refusing to amend Article 350, the Afghan 
Government not only increases the President’s authority but also 
creates a conflict with ACPA’s Article 362. 
Although the ACPA specifies the crimes for which the President 
can exercise his pardon power, it provides no mechanism or method for 
implementation.  In practice, this lack of guidance leaves room for 
abuse of power.  Further, while the President usually releases prisoners 
at an event expressly listed in the ACPA, the ACPA does not specify 
who should draft the pardon decree or what factors the drafters should 
consider.  This part of the Article focuses on explaining the pardoning 
decree’s drafting process and the different occasions in which the 
President typically exercises this power. 
Today, Afghanistan’s Ministry of Justice, in cooperation with the 
President’s office, typically drafts a pardon decree and sends it to the 
President for a final signature.57  Each presidential pardon decree 
establishes a committee at the central and provincial levels of 
government to determine which prisoners are eligible for a pardon 
decree.  Each committee usually consists of prosecutors, justice 
department representatives, members of the human rights office, police 
officers, and a civilian representative.58 
According to a pardon decree, the central committee is authorized 
to list eligible prisoners for reduced sentences or pardons.59  
Afterwards, the central committee sends the list to the President for 
                                                          
55.  See id. art. 352. 
56.  Id. art. 348. 
57.  See Moqarara-e-Tanzem Ejraat, supra note 34. 
58.  Office of the President, Pardon Decree, OCS.GOV. AF, 1395 (Dec. 11, 
2016), https://ocs.gov.af/dr/decree_details/185 (last visited Mar. 3, 2018). 
59.  Id. 
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approval.60  If the President approves the list, the Attorney General has 
to implement the decree and send the implementation report to the 
President’s office.61  According to the ACPA, the President can use his 
or her pardon power on certain occasions or at special events, as 
discussed below.62 
Under ACPA’s Article 354 , the Presidential should only grant 
pardon or punishment reduction decrees on special events.63  The 
President may grant pardons in the following five events: (1) the 
Prophet Mohammad’s birthday celebration; (2) Eid-e Ramazan; (3) 
Eid-e Qurban; (4) the victory of Afghan People’s Jihad; and (5) the 
Afghanistan Independence Day.64  These occasions have primarily 
been chosen based on religious guidance, rules, and national 
significance.  According to the Holy Quran’s provisions, Allah 
preferred pardon and forgiveness over revenge and punishment.65  
During the Rule of Law and Anti-Corruption Supreme Council’s recent 
meeting, the Attorney General suggested an increase in the number of 
special events when the President can grant pardons.66  The Attorney 
General wanted to increase the number of events to be consistent with 
international special occasions and have harmony with other 
countries.67  He argued this decision would enable the President to grant 
pardons or forgiveness to foreign prisoners, and thus would allow the 
                                                          
60.  Recently, the President authorized the Attorney General to approve the list 
of eligible prisoners who are convicted for less than five years imprisonment. Office 
of President, The Decree of the President of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan on 
the Rebate and Amnesty for the Prisoners and Prisoners on the Occasion of the Feast 
of Said al-Fitr, OCS.GOV, AF (2018), https://ocs.gov.af/dr/decree_details/5. 
61.  See Office of the President, Pardon Decree, supra note 58. 
62.  See 2014 Criminal Procedure Act, supra note 6, art. 354. 
63.   Id. art. 354 §§ 1-5. 
64.  Id. 
65.  THE HOLY QURAN 2:178. 
66.  Recently, the Attorney General has suggested more event to grant pardon. 
Office of President, The Session of the Justice and Judicial Committee of the Cabinet 
was Held, OCS.GOV.AF (July 2018), https://vpo.gov.af/ ھسلج-مکیھت-لدعی-و-اضقیی-
باکیھن-رازگرب-9 /.  
67.  Id. 
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Afghan government to ask other countries to reciprocate for Afghan 
citizens.68 
The last paragraph of Article 354 also authorizes the president to 
grant pardons on other occasions based on his discretion.69  These are 
called “special decree pardons.”  This broad power provides the 
President with discretion to pardon anyone on any occasion.  For 
example, on March 8, 2018, President Ghani granted a pardon decree 
under this authority, releasing at least sixty-eight prisoners in Kabul.70  
Another example occurred when Ghani entered into the peace 
agreement with HIA and committed to release all prisoners with HIA 
ties.71 
C. Abuse of the Pardon Power 
By allowing broad discretion over the issuance of pardons, Afghan 
law enables the President to abuse his authority—an outcome that likely 
occurs in a corrupt political climate. This section examines the 
dynamics of corruption and exposes how the President or other officials 
can abuse their power through the pardon procedure. 
1. Political Corruption 
In a country like Afghanistan where government organizations are 
weak or nonexistent, corruption has ample opportunity to undermine 
good governance, corrode official procedures, and interfere with 
government accountability.  The judiciary system strongly feels this 
                                                          
68. Office of the President, Jalse Shorai Hakemeyat Qanon Wan Mobareza 
Halee Fasad Adary Ba Reyasat Rahis Jomhor Ashraf Ghani Barguzar Shod [The 
Supreme Council for the Rule of Law and Anti-Corruption was convened by President 
Ghani], OCS.GOV.AF (June 24, 2018), https://president.gov.af/fa/news/628628. 
69.  See 2014 Criminal Procedure Act, supra note 6, art. 354(6). 
70.  68 Tan Mahjozen, Mahboseen Zan Dar Zendan Honasia Pul-e Charkhi 
Kabul Wa Markaz-e Esla Wa Tarbia Atfal, Mawred Haf Wa Takhfif Qarar Greftand 
[68 Convicted Women who were Detained in the Pul-e-Charkhi Prison of Kabul and 
Juveniles’ Detention and Rehabilitation Center, Pardoned and Reduced Punishment], 
ATTORNEY GENERAL’S OFFICE (Mar. 8, 2018), http://ago.gov.af/fa/news/437012. 
71.  See 75 Uzwe Hezb-e Islami, supra note 26. 
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corruption.  As explained above, officials have consequently abused the 
pardon power and committed political corruption.72 
Corruption is often defined as the abuse of public power or 
authority.73  In particular, political corruption is generally defined as 
the abuse of political power by government leaders or officials to 
maintain their power and authority.74  Even though officials can use 
their power for other purposes, their abuse of power is not necessarily 
political corruption, because political corruption’s main purpose is 
maintaining political power.75F75 
The legal and illegal actions of government officials in Afghanistan 
are difficult to differentiate, because Afghan laws provide officials with 
many broad or ill-defined powers.  For instance, when the Afghan 
Government signed a peace agreement with the HIA in September 
2016, the President made a commitment to release HIA prisoners 
through presidential pardon decrees.76  These decrees were signed 
despite the procedural deficiencies in the existing pardon laws.  
Although the HIA peace agreement was intended to provide peace and 
security in Afghanistan, the President seemingly had the ulterior motive 
of gaining HIA support in next year’s election.  The President and the 
Afghan government’s actions indicate they are trying to weaken 
political opponents and make themselves stronger.  In several cases, 
President Ghani has dismissed, arrested, and imprisoned his political 
opponents, particularly government officials who did not support him.77  
For example, President Ghani dismissed Atta Mohammad Noor, the 
powerful governor from the Balkh province, because he was important 
                                                          
72.  See generally Sorat Jals-e Shomara 12 Sale 1396 Shorai Hali Hakemeyat 
Qanon Wa Mobareza Halia Fasad-e Adare [Minutes of Meeting # 12 of Year 1396 
of Supreme Council for the Rule of Law and Anti-Corruption] (Feb. 13, 2018), 
http://www.aop.gov.af/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Minutes-of-Meeting-12.pdf. 
73.  Inge Amundsen, Political Corruption: An introduction to the Issues, 32, 
(CMI Working Paper WP 1999:7), https://www.cmi.no/publications/1040-political-
corruption. 
74.  USLEGAL, Political Corruption Law and Legal Definition, 
https://definitions.uslegal.com/p/political-corruption/ (last visited Apr. 12. 2018).  
75.  Id.  
76.  See generally Full text of Peace Agreement with HIA, supra note 25. 
77.  Eisa Khan Ayoobi, Ashraf Ghani: ‘Philosopher King’ or Ethnonationalist, 
AL JAZEERA (Feb. 6, 2018), https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/ashraf-ghani-
philosopher-king-ethnonationalist-180201144845423.html. 
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in securing the region.78  Moreover, Afghan Special Forces recently 
captured an Uzbek commander, Nezamuddin Qaisary, who fought 
alongside the government against the Taliban in the Faryab province, 
and then transferred him to Kabul.79 
The President has used this poorly-defined presidential pardon 
power in his favor to pardon individuals, despite Afghan laws being 
unclear on whether or how an individual can request a presidential 
pardon.  However, in practice, the President has issued many individual 
pardons and released many criminals from prisons since 2004, under 
the current Constitution.80  For example, former President Hamid 
Karzai granted individual pardons for three men who were convicted of 
gang-raping a woman in the Samangan province.81  The President 
granted these pardons because the three men allegedly had a great 
relationship with former President Karzai, one being a powerful local 
village commander.82 
2. Administrative Corruption 
Aside from political and security problems, Afghanistan’s 
government faces various challenges related to corruption and 
challenges that affect the process of creating a state.  Afghanistan’s 
government is dealing with threats to the “legitimacy” and stability of 
its sovereignty and rule of law.83  This broad and ill-defined pardon 
power can cause not only political corruption but also administrative 
                                                          
78.  Id.; see e.g. James Mackenzie, Powerful Afghan Regional Leader Ousted 
As Political Picture Clouds, REUTERS https://mobile.reuters.com/article/ 
amp/idUSKBN1EC2E1 (last visited Mar. 18, 2019). 
79.  Afghan Special Forces Arrest 25 Armed Locals in Faryab Over Militia 
Dispute, SALAAM TIMES (July 6, 2018), http://afghanistan.asia-
news.com/en_GB/articles/cnmi_st/newsbriefs/2018/07/06/newsbrief.  
80.  See e.g. Kate Clark, Afghan President Pardons Men Convicted of Bayonet 
Gang Rape, INDEPENDENT (Aug. 24, 2008), https://www.independent.co.uk/news/ 
world/asia/afghan-president-pardons-men-convicted-of-bayonet-gang-rape-
907663.html. 
81.  Id. 
82.  Id.  
83.  Maíra Martini, Overview of Corruption and Anti-Corruption in 
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corruption.  When there is no specific procedure for implementing the 
pardon power, corruption may arise among government employees, 
especially employees dealing with the prisoners’ release. 
In general, when the President issues a pardon decree, a committee 
reviews cases and lists the prisoners who are eligible for commuted 
sentences or pardons.84  The lack of a central database or electronic 
system gives this committee an unmonitored opportunity to consider 
bribes, nepotism, and other relationships when choosing to add or delete 
names from the list.85  Realistically, when a powerful or wealthy 
prisoner discovers who is on the committee, the committee could easily 
add a name to the pardon list.86  As long as someone is willing and able 
to pay the fee or engage in other corrupt practices, the committee could 
add their name on the pardon list.87  For instance, the President’s 
administrative office admittedly received many complaints about 
corruption in the commission, which is authorized to consider 
individuals eligible for pardon or punishment reduction.88  The 
complaints allege the commission considered individuals who did not 
qualify for the benefits of pardon decrees ignoring individuals who 
were qualified for pardons.89  Esmatullah, a former prisoner who was 
released from prison, said, “[i]f you know some officials or give money, 
you will be released from prison within three to five months. Otherwise, 
you will remain for two to three years.”90 
                                                          
84.  See 75 Uzwe Hezb-e Islami, supra note 26. 
85.  Supreme Council for the Rule of Law and Anti-Corruption Meeting, supra 
note 72, at 5-6. 
86.  Nasima Walizada, Fasad Dar Ejrae Farman Ahai Resat Jamhouri 
[Corruption in Implementing Presidential Pardon Orders], TKG.AF (2017), 
http://tkg.af/ داسف-رد-ارجای-نامرف %E2%80%8E اھی-وفع-ریتسا-ھمج / 
87.  See generally id. 
88.  Supreme Council for the Rule of Law and Anti-Corruption Meeting, supra 
note 72, at 5-6.  The President’s administration made its admission about corruption 
complaints in the Minutes-of-Meeting-12 of Supreme Council for the Rule of Law 
and Anti-Corruption. 
89.  Id. 
90.  Jawid Hasanzada, Qazi: Farman Reyasat Jamhore Bayad Balae Maboseen 
Ba Tawre Yaksan Tatbeq Shawad [Qazi: ThePresidential Decree Should be Applied 
to Prisoners Alike], AZADI RADIO (May 25, 2014)  
https://da.azadiradio.com/a/25397504.html.  
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3. Problems with Broad Discretion 
One of the improvements in the new Afghan Penal Code is the 
introduction of grounds for rehabilitation of criminals.91  These 
provisions introduce alternatives to imprisonment,92 reduction of 
sentences,93 and suspension of punishment.94  These approaches are 
consistent with general judiciary and government policies, and 
international standards aimed at rehabilitative or restorative justice.95  
However, the improvements still provides for broad discretion, creating 
substantial room for officials to disregard the law and undermine the 
judiciary.96  Judges are obligated to use their authority provided by the 
legislature to ensure the purposes of the punishment are satisfied.97  
They also should consider the family, cultural, social, and economic 
characteristics of the accused when they issue their verdict.98  Judges 
could use tools, such as the quality of the sentence and the suspension 
of punishment, at the time the issuance verdict is issued.  They could 
use also use other tools that are dedicated to the stage after the issuance 
of the ruling, such as conditional release.99  Today, the penalty system 
has been adopted at a minimum and a maximum in various legal 
                                                          
91.  These provisions entered into force on February 14, 2018. 
92.  CODE JAZA [PENAL CODE], art. 148, THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF 
AFGHANISTAN  1260, 1396 [2017] (Afg.). 
93.  Id. arts. 207-16. 
94.  Id. arts. 221-36. 
95.  ZAMEMA-E SHOMARA 2 QANON-E EJRAHAT JAZAEE DAR MOWREDE 
TATBEQ BADEL HAI HABS WA HAJZ [ANNEX (2) TO CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE ON 
IMPLEMENTATION OF ALTERNATIVE TO IMPRISONMENT AND DETENTION], art. 1 THE 
OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF AFGHANISTAN, EXTRAORDINARY ISSUE 1286, 1396 [2018] 
(Afg.). [hereinafter Annex2 to ACPA] 
96.  UNAMA Welcomes Afghanistan’s New Penal Code - Calls for Robust 
Framework to Protect Women Against Violence, UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE 
MISSION IN AFGHANISTAN (Feb. 22, 2018), https://unama.unmissions.org/unama-
welcomes-afghanistan%E2%80%99s-new-penal-code-calls-robust-framework-
protect-women-against-violence. 
97.  See Annex2 to ACPA, supra note 95, art. 8. 
98.  Zarorat Ahmal Takhfif Dar Rastai Habszedaee/ Takhfif Dar Majazat 
Nabayad Sababe Tajre Mojrem Showad [The need to grant pardon or reduce 
punishment to release from imprisonment should not be caused extreme criminals], 
yjc.ir, (May 4, 2014), https://www.yjc.ir/fa/news/4826043/. 
99.  Id. 
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systems.100  Under this system, criminal judges are required to impose 
a penalty below the statutory limitation or make a proportionate 
penalty.101 
Although deterrence is a goal of punishment, the Afghan 
government’s pardoning and reducing punishment policy102 is a 
releasing policy that decreases the number of prisoners to reduce the 
cost of prisons.103  This cost reduction can compensate for the injustices 
that have been committed by the weak and corrupt judicial system.104  
The Afghan Government seemingly adopts its releasing policy in 
consideration for the country’s poor economy and corruption problems.  
For the Afghan government to effectively implement its releasing 
policy, it needs to create effective procedure and method. 
Scholars who argue in favor of punishments aimed at deterrence 
note that it prevents not only an individual criminal, but also other 
criminals from committing crimes.105  Therefore, the act of pardoning 
and forgiving punishments should not eliminate the judiciary’s strength 
and the importance and intimidation of the law. 
In many cases, a criminal’s release through the pardon process has 
undermined the judiciary’s strength and the law.  The Sara case is one 
of the obvious examples.  In 2007, former president Hamid Karzai, 
pardoned three men convicted of raping a woman in the Samangan.106  
The rape victim, Sara, knew the President pardoned her rapists, who 
were convicted and sentenced to imprisonment for eleven years.107  
Sara’s husband, Dalawer, said, “[t]hese were men who had been 
sentenced and found guilty by the Supreme Court, [are] walking around 
freely.”108  A copy Hamid Karzai’s pardon was issued in May, 
recommending release of all three men because “they had been forced 
                                                          
100.  See Annex2 to ACPA, supra note 95, art. 8. 
101.  Id. 
102.  Id. art. 1. 
103.  See generally The Purposes of Punishment, UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA, 
http://open.lib.umn.edu/criminallaw/chapter/1-5-the-purposes-of-punishment/ (last 
visited Mar. 18, 2019). 
104.  Annex2 to ACPA, supra note 95. 
105.  The Purposes of Punishment, supra note 103. 
106.  Kate Clark, supra note 80. 
107.  Id.  
108.  Id. 
20
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 49, No. 2 [2019], Art. 3
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol49/iss2/3
Isar camera ready (Do Not Delete) 5/7/2019  10:03 AM 
2019] RE-DEFINING AFGHANISTAN’S PRESIDENTIAL PARDON LAW 317 
to confess to their crimes.”109  However, no evidence exists to prove 
that the three men had been forced to confess, and it is unlikely that 
someone can obtain a forced confession from powerful commanders in 
Afghanistan.110  This pardon shows how unbridled authority can cause 
problems and how authorized individuals can abuse power.  
Accordingly, Lord Acton, a British politician in the nineteenth century 
said, “[a]bsolute power corrupts absolutely.”111 
Therefore, the combined lack of a database on offenders, accurate 
information, and definite procedures for pardons and punishment 
reduction, along with weak government institutions have led to 
corruption.  Through this corrupt pardon process, many perpetrators are 
released from prison every year without a careful examination of the 
perpetrator’s records and status.  This corrupt process threatens to 
undermine the role of the judiciary and the rule of law. 
D. Lack of Meaningful Separation of Powers 
The 2004 Afghan Constitution, still in effect today, established the 
Afghan government as a centralized presidential system with powers 
separated into three branches: executive, legislative, and judicial.112  
The National Unity Government (“NUG”) was created to maintain 
peace and stability after neither of the major candidates, Dr. Ashraf 
Ghani and Dr. Abdullah Abdullah, would concede defeat in the 
controversial 2014 election.113 
The NUG is a power-sharing agreement under which both parties 
play a role.114  Under this agreement, the executive branch was divided 
                                                          
109.  Id.  
110.  Id.  
111. Lord Acton Quote Archive, ACTON INSTITUTE, 
https://acton.org/research/lord-acton-quote-archive (last visited Feb. 27, 2019).  
112.  See QANUNI ASSASI AFGHANISTAN [THE CONSTITUTION OF 
AFGHANISTAN], THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF AFGHANISTAN 818, 1383 [2004], Ch. 3, 
art 6. 
113.  Barnett R. Rubin & Georgette Gagnon, The U.S. Presence and 
Afghanistan’s National Unity Government: Preserving and Broadening the Political 
Settlement, CTR ON INT. COOPERATION (Aug. 2016), 
https://cic.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/national_unity_government_final.pdf. 
114.  Agreement Between the Two Campaign Teams Regarding the Structure of 
the National Unity Government, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 21, 2014), 
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into two parts: (1) the President, Dr. Ghani, as Commander-in-Chief 
and head of all three branches, and (2) the Chief Executive Officer 
(CEO), Dr. Abdullah, as the head of the Council of Ministers.115  The 
NUG  does not affect the President’s pardon power, because he remains 
the only person with that power under Article 64 of the Afghan 
Constitution.116  The President has this sole power under both 
structures—the structure established under the Constitution and the 
NUG. 
1. Executive Power 
Despite the separation of powers, the executive branch is much 
more powerful than the other two branches.  The President wields 
overruling power over the two other branches, notably over Parliament, 
because executive officials who are impeached by Parliament can 
remain in their positions for several months or years, based on the 
President’s order.117  For example, in 2016, the Afghan Parliament 
dismissed seven ministers118 with no confidence votes, President Ghani 
                                                          
http://documents.latimes.com/agreement-between-two-campaign-teams-
regardingstructure-national-unity-government/.  
115.  Id. 
116.  See QANUNI ASSASI AFGHANISTAN [THE CONSTITUTION OF 
AFGHANISTAN], THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF AFGHANISTAN 818, 1383 [2004], art. 64. 
117.  Kevin Sieff, Karzai Approves Impeachment of Two Key Afghan Ministers, 




118.  The seven ministers are the following individuals: Salahuddin Rabbani, 
the Minister of Foreign affairs; Mahmud Balegh, the Minister of Public Works; Nasrin 
Oryakhel, the Minister of Labour, Social Affairs, Martyrs and Disabled; Assadullah 
Hanif Balkhi, the Minister of Education; Mohammadullah Batash, the Minister of 
Transport and Civil Aviation; Farida Momand, the Minister of Higher Education; and 
Abdul Razeq Wahidi, the Minister of Telecommunication.  Thomas Ruttig. 
Parliament Kicks Out Ministers Again: A Multi-Dimensional Power Struggle, 
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ordered “the dismissed ministers to remain in office, and asked the 
Supreme Court to reverse the parliament’s decision.”119 
The President’s order allowed Salahuddin Rabbani, the dismissed 
Minister of Foreign affairs, to remain in his post despite his formal vote 
of no confidence.120  Although the other six ministers have since left 
their offices, the Supreme Court has not yet ruled on whether 
Parliament’s impeachments were constitutional.121  Parliament argued 
that Article 121 of the Afghan Constitution merely grants the Supreme 
Court the authority “to review the constitutionality of laws.122  Further, 
Parliament argued Article 121 does not authorize the Court to decide 
on the constitutionality of the Parliament’s appointment and removal 
powers.” 123  As it seems, the Supreme Court, in considering the current 
political situation, “has decided not to decide,” on this sensitive issue.124 
2. Legislative Power: Parliament 
Afghanistan’s Parliament consists of two houses: (1) the Wolesi 
Jirga (“House of Representatives”) and (2) the Meshrano Jirga (“House 
of Elders”).125  According to Afghanistan’s Constitution, a House of 
Representatives member shall be elected for a five-year term through a 
                                                          
119.  Shamshad Pasarlay, When Courts Decide Not to Decide: Understanding 
the Afghan Supreme Court’s Struggle to Decide the Fate of the Dismissed Ministers, 
ICONNECT BLOG (Mar. 22, 2017), http://www.iconnectblog.com/2017/03/when-
courts-decide-not-to-decide-understanding-the-afghan-supreme-courts-struggle-to-
decide-the-fate-of-the-dismissed-ministers/. 
120.  See, e.g., Catherine Putz, Power Struggle Continues Inside Afghan 
Government, THE DIPLOMAT, (Nov. 29, 2016), https://thediplomat.com/ 
2016/11/power-struggle-continues-inside-afghan-government/; Massoud Ansar, 
Ghani Accused of Violating Constitution, Disregarding Parliament, TOLO NEWS 
(Sept. 25, 2017), https://www.tolonews.com/afghanistan/ghani-accused-violating-
constitution-disregarding-parliament; Thomas Ruttig, Parliament Kicks Out 
Ministers Again: A Multi-Dimensional Power Struggle, AFGHANISTAN ANALYSTS 
NETWORK (Nov. 19, 2016), https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/parliament-kicks-
out-ministers-again-a-multi-dimensional-power-struggle/. 
121.  Pasarlay, supra note 119. 
122.  Id. 
123.  Id.  
124.  Id.  
125. See QANUNI ASSASI AFGHANISTAN [THE CONSTITUTION OF 
AFGHANISTAN], THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF AFGHANISTAN 818, 1383 [2004], art. 82. 
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direct, transparent, and fair election.126  Each province votes for a 
representative, and the seats are allocated in proportion to a provinces’ 
population.127 
However, the House of Elders’ composition is different, because 
the President selects one-third of its members for a five-year term.128  
The other two-thirds are elected through provincial councils for a four-
year term and district councils for a three-year term.129  Both houses 
have oversight powers over the executive branch by adopting laws.130  
The House of Representatives can also confirm the President’s 
appointment of government ministers and heads of independent 
offices.131  Although both Houses do not have a direct role or check on 
the President’s pardon power, they can indirectly limit this power by 
adopting laws under Article 90 §1 of the Afghan Constitution.132 
3. The Judicial Power and the Role of the Supreme Court 
Under Afghanistan’s Constitution, the Supreme Court consists of 
nine judges appointed by the President and confirmed by Parliament.133  
Due to the nature of judicial appointments, the executive and legislative 
branch appear capable of influencing judiciary decisions.  For example, 
the President has used judicial review, one of the Supreme Court’s 
important powers, against Parliament.134  Under Afghanistan’s 
Constitution, the Supreme Court has the authority to interpret the law 
at the request of the President or lower courts.135  This gives the 
President substantial power over judiciary decisions because the 
                                                          
126.  Id. art. 83. 
127.  Id.  
128.  Id. 
129.  Id. art. 84. 
130.  Id. art. 90. 
131.  QANUNI ASSASI AFGHANISTAN [THE CONSTITUTION OF AFGHANISTAN], 
THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF AFGHANISTAN 818, 1383 [2004], art. 91. 
132.  Id. 
133.  Id. art. 117. 
134.  Ghizaal Haress, Judicial Review in Afghanistan: A Flawed Practice, 
UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE (Aug. 2017), https://areu.org.af/wp-
content/uploads/2017/08/1722E-Judicial-Review-PN-1.pdf. 
135.  QANUNI ASSASI AFGHANISTAN [THE CONSTITUTION OF AFGHANISTAN], 
THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF AFGHANISTAN 818, 1383 [2004], art. 121. 
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President can simply request that the Supreme Court review laws that 
do not benefit the President’s interests.  Historically, the Supreme Court 
has often interpreted the law in the President’s favor.136  For instance, 
when Parliament adopted the “Law on Issuance of Legislative 
Decree,”137 the President vetoed it and sent it back to Parliament.138  
When Parliament ratified the law again with a two-thirds majority, the 
President requested that the Supreme Court review the law’s 
constitutionality.139  The Supreme Court revoked the Law on Issuance 
of Legislative Decree and emphasized the Executive Branch’s 
position.140  In this case, the Supreme Court of Afghanistan did not 
decide independently, showing its inability to limit the President’s 
powers, including the pardon power. 
II. SEEKING IDEAS FOR REFORM: PARDON POWERS IN IRAN AND 
WASHINGTON STATE 
A. The Iranian Model 
Historically, communities generally respond to crime with 
punishment.  Alongside punishment have been pardons, which have 
existed since ancient times.141  Those who committed crimes were 
sometimes pardoned in cases that considered specific conditions.142  
Today, the pardon institution continues to maintain its status despite the 
                                                          
136.  See generally QANUNI SODOR FARAMINE TAQNINE [LAW ON ISSUANCE OF 
LEGISLATIVE DECREE], arts. 10-16, THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF AFGHANISTAN 1285, 
1396 [2018] (Afg.). 
137.  Id. at 1340-42. 
138.  Id. at 1396. 
139.  Id. 
140.  Id. at 1406-1412. 
141.   See Dr. Ali Safari & Behnaz Rezai, Tahlile Bar Hainnama Kamison Haf 
Wa Takhfif Majazat Makomen Musaweb 12/9/1387 Dar Muqahisa Ba Hainnama 
Kamison Haf wa Takhfif wa Tabdel Mojazat Musaweg 16/5/1387 [An Analysis of 
Regulation of the Pardoning and Reducing the Punishment of Convicts Adopted in 
12/9/1387 Compared with the Regulation of the Pardoning, Reducing and Changing 
the Punishment of Convicts adopted in 16/5/1387], 2 (2015),  
http://lawmagazine.sbu.ac.ir/index.php/researchejuridique/article/view/978/978. 
[hereinafter Analysis of Pardoning Regulation]. 
142.  Id. 
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existence of practices, such as: conditional release, different types of 
punishment suspension, and alternative imprisonment and detention.143 
Iran’s pardon laws are a model for reform because its laws have 
been successful.  Further, as an Islamic republic, Iran shares many 
characteristics with Afghanistan’s system, particularly from a social-
political standpoint.  Both countries follow a combination of civil and 
Islamic law.144  Like Afghanistan, Iran is a multicultural country with 
many linguistic and ethnic groups.145  According to the World 
Factbook, 99.4% of Iran’s population are Muslim and the majority of 
them are Shi’a.146  Also, like Afghanistan, Iran’s official language is 
Farsi.147 
Iran has a unique pardon system because the pardon power is vested 
in the Revelation Leader rather than the President or other executive 
authorities.148  Iran’s system sets a good example for Afghanistan 
because, like in Afghanistan, Iran’s legislation derives from Islamic law 
and the Roman-German legal system.149  In light of its current legal and 
political structure, Iran pursues a specific policy of pardoning or 
reducing punishment.150  Meanwhile, Iran is also committed to 
combatting corruption and has safeguards to prevent abuses of the 
pardon power.151  Further, a study of Iran could be useful for 
Afghanistan because Iran has at least seventy-three years of legislative 
experience in pardon law or regulation.152 
                                                          
143.  Id. 
144.  Parviz Owsia, Sources of Law under English, French, Islamic and Iranian 
Law: A Comparative Review of Legal Techniques, 6 ARAB LAW QUARTERLY 33, 37 
(1991); Abdul Satar Sirat, The Modern Legal System of Afghanistan, 16-4 THE 
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LAW 563, 569 (1968); ERYAND 
ABRAHAMIAN, HISTORY OF MODERN IRAN 177 (Cambridge University Press (2008)). 
145.  Iran, CIA FACTBOOK, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/ir.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2018). 
146.   Id. Shi’a is one of the main schools of Islam. 
147.   Id. 
148.  QANUNI ASSASSI JUMHURI ISLAMI IRAN [THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN] July 28, 1989, art. 110 § 11, 1368 (Ir.). 
149.  Parviz Owsia, supra note 144, at 67. 
150.  Analysis of Pardoning Regulation, supra note 141. 
151.  Id. 
152.  Id. 
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Before 1979, the Iranian system was secular.153  After the 1979 
revolution, Islam became Iran’s official religion.154  The 1979 
revolution overthrew the Pahlavi Dynasty’s constitutional monarcy in 
Iran and replaced it with the Islamic Republic.155  Then, Iran adopted a 
constitution in 1979 that outlined its new system of governance; it was 
later revised in 1989.156  Iran’s 1989 Constitution created a combination 
of parliamentary democracy and Islamic theocracy with Islamic jurists 
holding a religious role under the Supreme Leadership Concept.157 
As the highest official authority, the Supreme Leader is accountable 
to the Assembly of Experts and exercises his authority under Article 
110 of Iran’s  Constitution.158  The Supreme Leader is also the 
Commander-in-Chief and has control over armed forces, foreign and 
domestic policies.159  He also appoints or dismisses the Chief of Justice, 
the head of the national radio and television, and the Commander of the 
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.160  Additionally, he authorizes and 
appoints six of the twelve members in the Council of Guardians.161 
Under the new Constitution, Iran’s president holds the second-
highest official position.162  Iran’s president is elected for a term of four 
                                                          
153.  The Structure of Power in Iran: An Overview of the Iranian Government 
and Political System, FRONTLINE, https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/ 
shows/tehran/inside/govt.html (last visited May 27, 2018). 
154. Greg Bruno, Religion and Politics in Iran, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN 
RELATIONS (June 19, 2018), https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/religion-and-politics-
iran. 
155. Iran, CIA FACTBOOK, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/ir.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2018). 
156. QANUNI ASSASSI JUMHURI ISLAMI IRAN [THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN] Dec. 3, 1979, art. 110 § 6, 1358 (Ir.). 
157. See generally QANUNI ASSASSI JUMHURI ISLAMI IRAN [THE CONSTITUTION 
OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN] July 28, 1989, [1368] (Ir.). 
158. QANUNI ASSASSI JUMHURI ISLAMI IRAN [THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN] (July 28, 1989), art. 110, 1368 (Ir.). 
159.  Id. 
160.  Id. 
161.  The Council of Guardians is a powerful body that has the authority to 
oversee the activities of Parliament and determines which candidates are qualified to 
run for public office. QANUNI ASSASSI JUMHURI ISLAMI IRAN [THE CONSTITUTION OF 
THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN] (July 28, 1989), art. 110 § 6(a), art. 91 § 1, 1368 (Ir.). 
162.  Id. art. 113. 
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years and can serve for two terms.163  He also heads the executive 
branch and inspires the implementation of the Constitution and 
economic policies.164  Iran’s president is accountable to the Iranian 
people, the Supreme Leader, and the Islamic Council.165 
Iran’s Constitution establishes a Parliament consisting of 290 
members who legislate and oversee the executive branch’s activities.166  
Iran’s Parliament members serve four-year terms with the power to pass 
laws and impeach ministers and the president.167  All bills passed by 
Iran’s Parliament are then reviewed by the Guardian Council.168 
The “Guardian Council,” or Shorai Negaban, consists of twelve 
members.169  Half of its members are theologians selected by the 
Supreme Leader; the remaining members are nominated by the Chief 
Justice and approved by parliament.170  Guardian Council members are 
elected for six-year terms and are responsible for reviewing all bills 
passed by Iran’s Parliament.171  Guardian Council members may also 
“bar candidates from standing in elections for parliament, the 
presidency and the Assembly of Experts.”172 
The judiciary is another important branch of the Iranian 
government.  The Supreme Leader appoints the Chief of Justice, or 
Head of Judiciary, to oversee the implementation and enforcement of 
Islamic laws and define legal policy.173 
                                                          
163.  Id. art. 114. 
164.  Id. art. 113, 114. 
165.  Id. art. 122. 
166.  Id. art. 64. 
167. QANUNI ASSASSI JUMHURI ISLAMI IRAN [THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN] (July 28, 1989), arts. 63, 71, 89, 1368 (Ir.).  
168. Id. art. 94. 
169. Id. art 91. 
170. Id. 
171. Id. art. 92 
172. Guide: How Iran is Ruled, BBC NEWS (June 9, 2009), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/8051750.stm.  
173. Id; QANUNI ASSASSI JUMHURI ISLAMI IRAN [THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN] (July 28, 1989), art. 110 §6(b), 1368 (Ir.). 
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Majlese Khebragan, or the Assembly of Experts, are authorized to 
appoint or dismiss the Supreme Leader.174  These clerics are elected for 
eight-year terms and can nominate themselves.175  The current 
assembly has eighty-six members and holds two sessions each year.176 
1. History of Iran’s Pardon Power 
Because the Quran recommends pardons, Iran’s Islamic 
government considers pardons an important institution.177  Iran has 
seriously applied the pardon institution in its criminal policy in 
accordance with religious recommendations, historical references, and 
social-political situations.178 
The pardon may be one of the oldest institutions in Iranian criminal 
law, which reportedly began during the time of Cyrus the Great.179  
Based on ancient Iranian books, Cyrus announced an amnesty after 
capturing Babylonia.180  The pardon has remained prominent in modern 
and contemporary Iranian criminal law since before the Islamic 
Revolution, dating back to the 1925 Penal Code.181 
Before the Islamic Revolution, Iran had the “Pardoning and 
Forgiveness Commission Regulations.”182  On October 20, 1945, the 
Ministry of Justice approved these regulations through eight articles.183 
The regulation did not design ordinary meetings for the Pardoning and 
Forgiveness Commission, but the General Penal Code requires the 
                                                          
174. QANUNI ENTEKHABAT WA HAIN NAMA-E DAKHILI MAJLESE KHEBRAGAN 
[THE ELECTION ACT AND INTERNAL REGULATION OF THE ASSEMBLY OF EXPERTS], 
art. 4, 1359 [1980] (Ir.). 
175. Id. 
176. Guide: How Iran is ruled, supra note 172. 
177. THE HOLY QURAN, 2:178. 
178.  Analysis of Pardoning Regulation, supra note 141. 
179.  Id. 
180.  R.J. VAN DER SPEK, Cyrus the Great, Exiles and Foreign Gods A 
Comparison of Assyrian and Persian Policies on Subject Nations, in Extraction & 
Control 1, 1 (Michael Kozuh et al. eds, 2014). 
181.  Analysis of Pardoning Regulation, supra note 141, at 5. 
182.  Id. 
183.  Id. 
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commission to be held at the Office of Legal Affairs of the Ministry of 
Justice every four months.184 
On September 19, 1964, the Minister of Justice adopted another 
regulation entitled “Regulations of the Pardoning and Forgiveness 
Commission.”185  Set in eighteen articles, this new regulation required 
the Pardoning and Forgiveness Commission to convene four meetings 
every year, under the authority of the Chief of the Office of the 
Justice.186  This regulation was amended on July 14, 1975, and was 
enforced with thirteen articles until Iran’s Islamic Revolution.187 
After the Islamic Revolution, Article 110 of the 1979 Iranian 
Constitution governed the Supreme Leader’s duties and authority.188  
This article authorized the Supreme Leader to issue pardons or reduce 
punishment through the Chief Justice’s recommendations and “within 
the framework of Islamic criteria.”189  When Iran amended its 
Constitution in 1989, it continued to vest the Supreme Leader with 
power to “pardon[] or reduc[e] the sentences of convicts . . . after the 
head of the judiciary power has recommended such a motion.”190 
Iran’s Constitution ultimately gave the Supreme Leader pardon 
power rather than its president.191  Article 110 § 11 of Iran’s 
Constitution authorized the Supreme Leader to reduce or pardon 
convicted prisoners according to the Chief Justice’s request.192  Iran 
recognized this pardon power by adopting the Penal Code, the Criminal 
Procedure Codes, and the Regulation of the Pardoning and Reducing 
the Punishment of Convicts.193  Article 96 of the Iranian Islamic 
Criminal Code mirrors the language of the Constitution by stating, 
                                                          
184.  Id. Article 55 of the General Penal Code provides that the Pardoning and 
Forgiveness Commission must be held at the Office of Legal Affairs of the Ministry 
of Justice every four months. 
185.  Id. at 4. 
186.  Id. at 5. 
187.  Id.  
188.  QANUNI ASSASSI JUMHURI ISLAMI IRAN [THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN] Dec. 3, 1979, art. 110, 1358 (Ir.). 
189.  Id. art. 110 § 6 
190.  QANUNI ASSASSI JUMHURI ISLAMI IRAN [THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN] (July 28, 1989), art. 110 § 11, 1368 (Ir.). 
191.  Id. 
192.  Id.  
193.  Analysis of Pardoning Regulation, supra note 141. 
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“[p]ardon or mitigation of punishment of the convict, in accordance 
with Islamic principles, is upon the proposal of the Head of Judiciary 
and approval of the Leader.”194  Thus, Iran’s Supreme Leader has 
pardon power in Iran. 
After 1979, the legislature emphasized the sources of Islamic law 
in upholding the pardon institution.195  Consequently, on May 11, 1980, 
the Supervisory Board of Ministry of Justice approved the first 
“Pardoning and Forgiveness Regulation” in fourteen articles.196  
However, this regulation was abolished after nine months, when the 
Supreme Judicial Council approved a new regulation based on Article 
110 section 6 of the 1979 Constitution.197  The Pardoning Regulation 
has since been amended five times.198  In December 2008, the Head of 
the Judiciary adopted the current “Pardoning and Forgiveness 
Regulation” and made a Central Commission, combining five judges 
with a provincial commission from each province to review pardon 
requests.199 
2. Iran’s Mechanisms and Methods for Pardons or  
Punishment Reductions 
This section will illustrate Iran’s current mechanisms and methods 
for issuing pardons at the central and provincial level.  This section will 
also discuss the Central and Provincial Commissions’ structure, and 
how other organizations and administrations play a role in certain 
aspects of pardon procedures.  This discussion will identify how 
Afghanistan should use Iran’s approach to prevent the abuse of 
discretion and corruption that is infecting Afghanistan’s system. 
Article 1 of Iran’s current Regulation of the Pardoning and 
Reducing Punishment of the Convicts forms the Pardoning and 
Reducing Punishment Commissions in the Central and Provincial 
level.200  These Commissions were designed to implement the authority 
                                                          
194.  QANUNI MAJAZATE ISLAMI [THE ISLAMIC PENAL CODE], art. 96, 1392 
(Ir.). 
195.  Analysis of Pardoning Regulation, supra note 141, at 6. 
196.  Id. 
197.  Id. at 7. 
198.  Id. 
199.  2008 Iranian Pardoning Regulation, supra note 9, art. 2,3. 
200.  Id. art. 1. 
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provided in Article 110 paragraph 11 of the Iranian Constitution.201  
The Central Commission is composed of five judges who should be 
familiar with Islamic and ordinary law and have ten years judicial 
experience.202  Under this regulation, the Chief of Justice is authorized 
to appoint the Central Commission members for five years and select 
one member as head of the commission.203  Although the member 
selection process lacks democratic characteristics, the Central 
Commission’s existence is considered a positive factor.  The Central 
Commission requires its meetings to maintain a quorum of at least three 
members, and its decisions are validated with three votes.204 
Provincial Commissions are also formed based on the Iran’s current 
Regulation of the Pardoning and Reducing Punishment of the 
Convicts.205  Provincial Commissions can hold their meetings and make 
decisions with the presence of three members and a majority vote.206  A 
Provincial Commission consists of the General Head of the Provincial 
Justice Department, a judiciary representative from the respective 
province, the provincial prosecutor, and the Director General of the 
province’s prisons.207  Under this regulation, the following individuals 
can request a pardon: the Head of the Justice Department, the 
prosecutors, the judge of the prison observer, the prison chief, the 
convicted person, and the convicted person’s family.208  If either the 
Central Commission or the Provincial Commission find the pardon or 
punishment reduction request eligible, the Central Commission may 
refer the request to the Supreme Court.209  Once the Chief Justice 
ratifies the pardon request, it is presented to the Supreme Leader for a 
final decision.210 
During a formal meeting and evidence assessment, the Provincial 
Commission determines whether an application for pardon or sentence 
                                                          
201.  Id. 
202.  Id. art. 2. 
203.  Id. art. 2, 3. 
204.  2008 Iranian Pardoning Regulation, supra note 9, art. 3. 
205.  Id. art. 4 
206.  Id.  
207.  Id. 
208.  Id. art. 6. 
209.  Id. art. 15. 
210.  2008 Iranian Pardoning Regulation, supra note 9, art. 15. 
32
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 49, No. 2 [2019], Art. 3
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol49/iss2/3
Isar camera ready (Do Not Delete) 5/7/2019  10:03 AM 
2019] RE-DEFINING AFGHANISTAN’S PRESIDENTIAL PARDON LAW 329 
reduction is eligible.211  If the appplication is eligible, the Provincial 
Commission will send the Secratariat of the Central Commission its 
reasons for accepting the application and a recommendation in a full 
status report.212  If the Provincial Commission finds a pardon or 
reduction request ineligible, it will archive the request unless the Chief 
Justice of Iran refers the request to the Central Commission for 
consideration and final determination.213  The Chief Justice’s ability to 
interfere with requests shows how the Provincial Commissions do not 
have the final authority to determine a pardon request.  The Chief 
Justice and the Central Commission can always decide to re-examine 
pardon or reduction requests, which reduces the Provincial 
Commissions’ significance and undermines their independence. 
Iran’s pardon process shows its commitment to efficiency.  Iran’s 
current pardon regulation made the Information Office, Counter 
Narcotics Department, and other relevant departments responsible for 
answering all official requests from the Central and Provincial 
Commissions.214  Both the Central and Provincial Commissions 
conduct meetings every fifteen days and anticipate fourteen occasions 
for implementing the pardon and reducing punishment in the Pardon 
Regulation.215  This frequency and efficiency shows the Iranian 
government’s serious and decisive commitment to release the 
prisoners.216 
If the Provincial Commission reviews and finds pardon requests 
eligible, it will make a list and send their decision to the Central 
Commission one month before the deadline.217  These decisions come 
with the Provincial Commission’s recommendations and explanations 
for an applicant’s eligibility for pardon or punishment reduction.218  The 
Provincial Commission cannot send its decisions directly to the 
                                                          
211.  Id. art. 8. 
212.  Id. The full status report provides information on the status of convicts in 
the province. 
213.  Id. 
214.  Id. arts. 7, 10, 22.  
215.  Id. art. 15. 
216.  2008 Iranian Pardoning Regulation, supra note 9, art. 15. 
217.  See id.  
218.  Id. 
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Supreme Court.219  This means the Central Commission reviews all lists 
provided by Provincial Commissions throughout Iran.  Then, the 
Central Commission sends the eligible pardon or punishment reduction 
lists to the Supreme Court, which forwards all the lists to the Supreme 
Leader for ratification.220 
The Central Commission also makes two lists noting the following: 
(1) prisoners who are eligible for pardons, and (2) prisoners who are 
eligible for punishment reduction.221  Pardoned prisoners are released 
as soon as possible, and a releasing report is sent back to the Central 
Commission, ten days after the pardon issued.222  This shows efficiency 
in Iran’s process. Further, if pardons for convicted persons lack 
conditions, the Chief of Justice can offer the convicted person a pardon 
concurrently by mentioning preferred causes or justifiable reasons, 
which also undermines the Central and Provincial Commissions’ 
independency and role.223 
3. Lessons from the Iranian Approach 
The Iranian approach shows a pardon should not undermine 
judicial authority, and that an effective and qualified body should 
carefully examine a pardon request to ensure unrehabilitated persons 
are not released from prison.224  Although Afghanistan’s Constitution 
gives the President pardon power, its lack of procedure undermines the 
judiciary system’s role and fosters corruption.  By considering Iran’s 
model, Afghanistan can adopt a pardon institution to stop corruption 
and the abuse of power, and implement laws that ensure respect for 
judicial decisions and the rule of law. 
Iran’s approach is also an effective model because it allows 
prisoners and their relatives to request pardons through specified 
procedures.225  Unfortunately, Afghanistan’s laws do not provide a 
specific right to seek pardon and they do not explicitly explain how a 
                                                          
219.  Id. 
220.  Id. 
221.  Id. art. 16. 
222.  Id. art. 17. 
223.  Id. art. 20. 
224.  Id. art. 24 § 10. 
225.  2008 Iranian Pardoning Regulation, supra note 9, art. 1. 
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person petitions for a pardon.  By establishing an official mechanism 
for pardon requests, Iran’s approach reduces the need for unofficial 
dealings and requests, which could be corrupted by bribes and favors.  
Therefore, Afghanistan should recognize the fundamental right to 
request pardons by adopting a regulation or amending the ACPA.  
Afghanistan could even amend its Constitution to recognize pardon 
petition rights and limit the President’s pardon power. 
However, Iran’s regulation on pardon power does have some 
weaknesses.  While having authority to appoint Commission members, 
the Chief Justice also has the power to recommend pardons to the 
Supreme Leader.226  The Chief Justice can make these 
recommendations even if the petition does not meet the circumstances 
provided in the regulation.227  This Iranian approach may undermine 
the commissions’ independence.  Moreover, the Provincial 
Commissions’ decisions may be overturned by the Central 
Commission, which undermines the Provincial Commissions’ authority 
and independence. 
B. The Washington State Model 
Although Washington State’s laws and society vastly differ from 
Afghanistan, aspects of Washington’s pardon law could be a helpful 
model for Afghanistan.  Despite the socio-political differences, 
Washington State offers Afghanistan some sound practices and model 
rules.  Washington State provides detailed directions for its pardoner 
and specifies clear legal methods for carrying out pardons or reducing 
punishments.  These processes can be adapted to Afghanistan’s 
conditions and legal system. 
1. Brief History of Pardon Power in the U.S. 
Although the pardon power is an ancient principle, the logic and 
rationale behind this practice remains a controversial issue among 
scholars.228  All legal practices are created in communities for specific 
                                                          
226.  Id. art. 2, 15 
227.  Id. art. 20. 
228.  Kristen H. Fowler, Limiting the Federal Pardon Power, 83 IND. L.J. 1651, 
1653 (2008), https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article 
=1287&context=ilj. 
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purposes and are justified through logic and reason.  The pardon power 
is also a practice that has been created based on society’s needs.  The 
pardon power was incorporated into the United States Constitution by 
following England’s common law. 229F229  When the United States 
Constitution was ratified, the pardon power was one of the United 
States President’s “least limited” powers. 230F230  Although many people 
questioned the practice of presidential pardons, its supporters 
highlighted the rationale behind its existence. 231F231  Alexander Hamilton 
emphasized the need for pardons in his Article No 74. 232F232 
Although this article does not intend to discuss the rationale behind 
the pardon power, this issue must be discussed in order to understand 
the value of the pardon practice in the United States.233  The logic and 
rationale behind each practice can vary among societies, but the pardon 
power generally fulfills four useful functions: (1) to reverse wrongful 
convictions; (2) to eliminate punishments that are not commensurate 
with the crime committed; (3) to “restore national unity, either by 
ending a conflict or by forgiving the losers,”234 and (4) to use the power 
as a political and “foreign policy tool to satisfy foreign leaders.”235 
2. Pardons Under the Washington State Constitution, the Revised 
Code of Washington State, and Clemency Bylaws of the Clemency and 
Pardoning Board 
Following the United States Constitution, various American States 
vest pardon authority or competence in their governors.  In 1878, when 
the territory of Washington was trying to achieve statehood in the 
                                                          
229.  Brian C. Kalt, Pardon Me: The Constitutional Case Against Presidential 
Self-Pardons, 106 YALE L.J. 779, 782 (1996-1997).  
230.  See William F. Duker, The President’s Power to Pardon: A Constitutional 
History, 18 WM. & MARY L. REV. 475, 523 (1977), 
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr/vol18/iss3/3. 
231. Alexander Hamilton, The Federalist Papers: No. 74: The Command of the 
Military and Naval Forces, and the Pardoning Power of the Executive From the New 
York Packet (Mar. 25, 1788), THE AVALON PROJECT—LILLIAN GOLDMAN LAW 
LIBRARY, YALE LAW SCHOOL, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/fed74.asp. 
232.  Id. 
233.  Fowler, supra note 228. 
234.  Id. at 1653-54. 
235.  Id. 
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United States,236 a convention tried to ratify a proposed constitution.237 
However, after failing to get the United States Congress’s endorsement, 
the Washington territory could not ratify its constitution and get state 
recognition.238  Although the attempt was unsuccessful, the proposal 
took the pardon power into consideration.239 
In 1889, Washington drafted another Constitution, which was a 
comparative study of various State constitutions.240  This draft was sent 
to Congress for ratification and State recognition.241  Through the 
Washington Constitution’s ratification, Washington became the 42nd 
State of America.242  Washington State’s Constitution vested pardon 
power in its State Governor under article three section nine.  This article 
section is identical to the provisions in Washington State’s draft 
Constitution of 1878243 and the Hill Constitution.244 
While Washington’s 1889 Constitution was being drafted, two 
opposing views disputed the placement of pardon power.245  One view 
wanted to give pardon power to a Governor’s Council, which would 
work along with the Governor.246  Others disagreed with this position 
and argued that the constitution “already permitted the legislature to 
experiment and this prerogative would be eliminated under the 
amendment.”247  Two representatives, George Turner and Allen Weir, 
emphasized that “the pardoning power should be placed in a single 
                                                          
236. The territory of Washington was not recognized as a state of the United 
States in 1878. 
237. Elizabeth Gibson, First Washington Constitutional Convention convenes 
in Walla Walla on June 11, 1878., HISTORY LINK (Mar. 7, 2006), 
http://historylink.org/File/7648. 
238.  Id.  
239.  Id. 
240.  Arthur S. Beardsley, Sources of the Washington State Constitution, 
Preface to THE STATE OF WASHINGTON, 2011-2012, LEGISLATIVE MANUAL 402, 
https://lib.law.uw.edu/waconst/sources/LegManBeardsley.pdf 
241.  Id. 
242.  Id. 
243.  WASH. CONST. 1878, Art. VIII, Sec. 5. 
244.  Beardsley supra note 240, Hill, Art. V, Sec 9.  
245.  QUENTIN SHIPLEY SMITH, THE JOURNAL OF THE WASHINGTON STATE 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 1889, 569 (Beverly Paulik Rosenow ed., 1999). 
246.  Id. 
247.  Id. 
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person who then would be responsible and be more likely not to abuse 
this power.”248  The first group lost, receiving only three votes.249  
Based on the pardon power provided in the Washington State 
Constitution, the Revised Code of Washington (“RCW”) authorizes the 
State Governor to grant pardons or reduce punishment.250  The RCW 
even allows the State Governor to issue an extraordinary release.251  
The RCW also establishes a Clemency and Pardons Board (“Board”) 
within the Governor’s Office.252 
Washington State’s Constitution authorizes the Governor to grant 
pardons, but it also permits the legislature to limit this power through 
legislation.  In article III section nine, Washington State’s Constitution 
states, “the pardoning power shall be vested in the governor under such 
regulations and restrictions as may be prescribed by law.”253  Under this 
Article, legislatures may restrict the pardon power by passing statutes. 
Under the RCW’s section 9.94A.880, “[t]he clemency and pardons 
board is established as a board within the office of the governor.”254  
The Board “ shall receive petitions from individuals, organizations, and 
the department for review and commutation of sentences and pardoning 
of offenders in extraordinary cases, and shall make recommendations 
thereon to the governor.”255  Based on the RCW, the Board reviews 
pardon requests and recommends eligible pardon requests to the 
governor.256  The Board can also receive pardon requests from 
individuals or organizations, who lost their civil rights because of 
“committed federal offenses or out-of-state felonies.”257  However, the 
RCW’s establishes procedural limitations by stating, “[t]he board shall 
not recommend [to] governor [to] grant clemency . . . until a public 
hearing has been held on the petition.”258  This RCW provision 
                                                          
248.  Id. 
249.  Id.  
250.  WASH REV. CODE § 9.94A.728 (1974). 
251.  Id. 
252.  WASH REV. CODE § 9.94A.880 (1974). 
253.  WASH. CONST. art. III, § 9. 
254.  WASH REV. CODE § 9.94A.880 (1974). 
255.  WASH REV. CODE § 9.94A.885 (1974). 
256.  Id. 
257.  Id. 
258.  Id. 
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indirectly limits the Board and the governor’s power by preventing the 
Board from recommending pardons and the governor from granting 
pardons without a hearing process, which is clearly mentioned in the 
Bylaws.259 
3. Clemency and Pardons Board: A Closer Look 
The Clemency and Pardons Board is established as a committee 
within the Governor’s Office.260  The Board consists of five members 
who are appointed by the governor and approved by the Senate for four-
year terms.261  They choose their chairman and vice-chairman, and 
adopt bylaws to manage all pardon procedures and processes.262  
According to the Board’s bylaws, the Department of Corrections, 
organizations, and every individual can request a pardon review or 
commutation sentences.263  The Board must hold quarterly hearings,264 
but the Governor, the Board’s Chairperson, or a Board majority can 
request a special hearing at any time.265 
Notably, the Governor has authority to either accept a Board 
recommendation or reject it.266  The Board uses specific steps to 
determine whether to recommend a pardon case to the Governor.267 
Before the Board conducts a hearing, a pardon petition is reviewed 
by the “Preliminary Review Committee,” which consists of two Board 
members. 268  According to the Board’s bylaws, the Chairman 
authorizes “Preliminary Review Committees” to determine “whether a 
petition will [provide] for hearing to the full Board.”269  If one 
                                                          
259.  See id. 
260.  WASH REV. CODE § 9.94A.880 (1974). 
261.  Id. §§ 1, 2. 
262.  Id. § 3. 
263.  CLEMENCY AND PARDONS BOARD, BYLAWS OF THE WASHINGTON STATE 
CLEMENCY AND PARDONS BOARD, art. 1 § 2 (Mar. 22, 2011). 
264.  Id. art. 3 § C. 
265.  Id. art. 3 § C. 
266.  Washington Clemency & Pardons Board Policies, supra note 17. at 1. 
267.  CLEMENCY AND PARDONS BOARD, BYLAWS OF THE WASHINGTON STATE 
CLEMENCY AND PARDONS BOARD, arts. 2 § 11, 3 §§ 1-2 (Mar. 22, 2011). 
268.  Id. art 3. 
269.  Id. art. 2 § 11.  
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Preliminary Review Committee member votes in favor of the pardon 
petition, the Board will conduct a full hearing.270 
The Board conducts regular and special hearings.  Regularly 
hearings are held quarterly and are open to every individual.271  Special 
hearings can only be held when “[t]he Governor, the Board’s 
Chairperson, or a majority of the Board may call.”272  After the 
Preliminary Review Committee agrees to conduct a hearing, the full 
Board hears the parties’ statements and presentations.273  After the 
Board hears all statements, it deliberates and decides whether or not to 
recommend a pardon petition to the Governor.274  During public hearing 
deliberations, each Board member will vote and explain his or her 
reasons for the recommendation.275  Then, the Board will submit a non-
binding recommendation to the Governor.276 
4. Lessons from the Washington Approach 
Washington’s policies and general approach provide a good model 
for criminal rehabilitation and generally promote justice, including the 
rule of law.  Most importantly, Washington’s model shows how a 
government can strengthen and support its justice institutions, while 
pardoning individuals whose presence in prison is not necessary.  
Washington’s approach allows prisoners to rejoin the community with 
encouragement and forgiveness.  Unlike Afghanistan, Washington’s 
approach provides clear checks on executive power, and prevents 
corruption.  Afghanistan may benefit to set up an independent board, 
like the Washington Clemency and Pardoning Board, to review pardons 
or reduce punishment requests.  Afghanistan could also emulate 
Washington’s pardon process by processing pardon requests at the 
central level. 
                                                          
270.  Washington Clemency & Pardons Board Policies, supra note 17, at 3. 
271.  Id. art. 3 §§ 1, 2. 
272.  Id. art. 3 § 2.  
273.  Id. art. 2 § 11. 
274.  Id. art. 1 § 2. 
275.  Washington Clemency & Pardons Board Policies, supra note 17, at 5. 
276.  Id. 
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III. RECOMMENDED CHANGES TO THE AFGHAN APPROACH  
ON PARDONS 
Despite their differences, both Iran and Washington State have 
clear and detailed laws and procedures that could help Afghanistan’s 
legislators seek solutions to corruption and to the President’s abuse of 
pardon power.  First, the Afghan Constitution should modify the scope 
and purpose of the President’s power to pardon convicted criminals.  
Second, the ACPA should define the limits on the President’s pardon 
power and establish The Board of Pardoning and Reducing Punishment 
(the “Pardon Board”).  Finally, to implement this power and authority, 
Afghanistan will need a regulation that particularly describes the 
pardon process’s methods and mechanisms, as well as the structure and 
authority of the Pardon Board. 
To implement the above suggestions, Afghanistan’s Government 
first needs to amend its Constitution to modify and limit the scope of 
the President’s pardon power.  Then, Afghanistan needs to enact 
statutes that modify the Constitutional pardon power and establish an 
independent board that defines the scope of the President’s pardon 
power.  Finally, the Afghan Government needs to authorize the Pardon 
Board to recommend pardons or punishment reductions to the President 
in accordance with regulations passed by the Pardoning Board. 
A. Amending Afghanistan’s Constitution to Modify the Scope and 
Purpose of the President’s Pardon Power 
This article recommends for Afghanistan to amend Article 64 §18 
of its Constitution to clarify the President’s pardon power, like 
Washington State.  Currently, Afghanistan’s Constitution authorizes 
the President to grant pardons or reduce punishments, but its broad 
language fails to provide specific processes and procedures.  This 
language should be specifically changed to narrow and define the scope 
of the President’s power.  Further, Afghanistan should establish a 
pardon board and enact statutes that details the process and mechanism 
for pardons.  Afghanistan’s Constitution should also incorporate 
provisions that permit every individual or convicted relative to request 
pardons or punishment reductions.  Finally, Afghanistan should pass an 
amendment to authorize the House of Representatives to ratify and 
impeach members of the Pardon Board.  By making these changes, 
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Afghanistan can limit presidential corruption through the pardon 
power. 
B. Amending the Afghan Criminal Procedure Act to Define the Limits 
of the President’s Pardon Power 
Like Washington’s approach, an ACPA amendment should be 
adopted to establish the Pardon Board and modify procedures, 
clarifying who can request a pardon under specific conditions and 
circumstances.  Following Iran and Washington’s approach, the ACPA 
should allow every individual, his relatives, and his attorney to seek 
pardons or punishment reductions.  Afghanistan should amend ACPA 
article 348, which states, “[a] pardon shall be carried out by the decree 
of the president,” and change it to Washington’s approach.  This 
approach would change Afghanistan’s system by providing the Pardon 
Board sole authority to recommend a pardon and the President may only 
ratify or reject it.277  Finally, like Washington’s Revised Code, the 
ACPA should authorize the Pardon Board to adopt regulations that 
specifically outline all pardon procedures and mechanisms, and the 
duties and responsibilities of Pardon Board members. 
To accomplish all the above recommendations, the second section 
of Article 348 must also be amended.  As stated above, this section 
states, “[a] pardon shall not dismiss consequential and complementary 
punishments and security measures and consequences of criminal 
charges and does not affect previously applied punishments unless the 
issued pardon decree states otherwise.”278  This language should be 
changed because it gives the President broad authority and allows him 
to abuse his power.  Furthermore, this language has blurred the 
distinctions between pardon and restoring prestige.  Restoring the 
prestige under Afghanistan’s laws means a person convicted “due to a 
felony or misdemeanor may be eligible” to request to restore their 
prestige “after full enforcement of the . . .  punishment or being 
pardoned.”279  The Court only grants this restoration for felonies after 
six years and for misdemeanors after three years.280  Therefore, the 
                                                          
277.  Washington Clemency & Pardons Board Policies, supra note 17 art. 3 §§ 
1, 2. 
278.  See 2014 Criminal Procedure Act, supra note 6, art. 348 § 2. 
279.  Id. art. 362. 
280.  Id. 
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language in ACPA’s article 348 section 2 authorizes the President to 
pardon “previously applied punishments” by issuing a pardon decree 
which “states otherwise.”  Therefore, this language should be amended 
to prevent the president from further imposing his authority over the 
judiciary. 
C. Creating a Pardon and Punishment Reduction Board 
In accordance with modifying Afghanistan’s Constitution and 
ACPA, the Pardon Board should be empowered to establish rules that 
define who may examine pardon cases and how punishment should be 
reduced.  The Pardon Board should also have authority to determine 
whether a pardon should be recommended to the President in a way that 
does not undermine the judiciary system.  Pardon Board 
recommendations should also focus on helping a convicted person 
return as a productive member of society.  Through these 
recommendations, the Board could arrange for and ratify regulations, 
administrative structures, professional and administrative meetings, 
and plans and strategies.  The authority would permit the Pardon Board 
to effectively implement pardons and punishiment reductions.  
However, the Pardon Board’s regulations should clearly state how 
pardon cases should be examined, how many ordinary meetings should 
occur every year, what circumstances can convict, and how other 
involved parties bring petitions to the Pardon Board. 
Moreover, Pardon Board regulations should also clarify the duties 
and responsibilities of the Pardon Board’s members, the conditions for 
member dismissal, and  the appointment of a Pardon Board member.  
Like Washington’s approach, the regulations should also consider the 
members’ right to vote and how it should be excercised, and the process 
for policy-making. 
Lastly, to successfully implement all these recommendations, 
Afghanistan’s Board should have a legal structure with knowledgeable 
members, a defined authority, a specific policy-making mechanism. 
1. Structure and Framework 
Afghanistan’s Pardon Board structure should involve two tiers.  
The first tier should be modeled after Washington’s Board, as an 
independent board in the capital city of Kabul (the “Central Board”).  
43
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The second tier should be modeled after Iran’s Provincial Commissions 
which are set in each of the provinces (the “Provincial Board”). 
Like Washington’s approach, Afghanistan’s Central Board 
members could be nominated by the President, Council of Ministers or 
the President’s Cabinet.  Then, the Wolesi Jirga, or House of 
Representatives, will ratify the Board nominations.  Afghanistan’s 
Central Board could have seven members.  Like Washington, the 
Central Board members could choose their chairman and vice-chairman 
among their members.  However, the chairman and vice-chairman’s 
terms should be limited to one year, which is slightly different from 
Washington because it is not clearly mentioned in the Washington 
Board’s bylaws.  Additionally, the Central Board would have ordinary 
meetings on occasional events that are clearly laid out in the ACPA.281  
This is again slightly different from Washington, because the 
Washington Board consists of five members that hold ordinary 
meetings quarterly.282 
As for provincial commissions, each province could have five 
members who are nominated by the Central Board and ratified by the 
President.  This is slightly different from Iran’s model because the 
Iran’s regulation states that the provincial commission’s members are 
selected from local officials.283  Afghanistan’s Provincial Board, like 
the Central Board, should also choose their chairman and vice-chairman 
for a one-year term.  The Provincial Board’s decisions may be sent to 
the Central Board for uniformity.  From there, both boards’ decisions 
could be sent to the President. 
The proposed process for Afghanistan would be partially similar 
and partially different from Iran’s model.  In Iran, the Provincial 
Commission sends their decision to the Central Commission for 
uniformity, then the Central Commission refers the decision to the 
Supreme Leader, not the President.284  However, both of Afghanistan’s 
Central and Provincial Boards could have administrative support that 
prepares documents and evidence for the Board and informs all parties 
about the hearing process and meetings.  This administrative support 
system would emulate Washington and Iran’s models. 
                                                          
281.  See 2014 Criminal Procedure Act, supra note 6, art. 354 (1-5). 
282.  WASH REV. CODE § 9.94A.880 (1974). 
283.  2008 Iranian Pardoning Regulation, supra note 9, art. 4.  
284.  Id. art. 15. 
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2. Qualification and Selection of Members 
The Central Board’s members could be nominated by the President, 
Council of Ministers or Cabinet.  This nomination could be ratified by 
House of Representative for a term of three years.  However, Central 
Board members should have at least five years of judicial experience 
and have a bachelor’s degree in civil law or Sharia Law. 
The Iranian and Washington State models have several similarities 
and differences with regard to nominations.  In Washington, the 
Governor nominates Board members for four-year terms and the Senate 
ratifies the Governor’s nomination.285  Washington’s Board only 
requires its members to be a registered voter in the State.286  In contrast, 
the Iran Central Commission members need to serve as judges for at 
least ten years and they must be familiar with Islamic law.287  Moreover, 
the Chief of Justice selects Iran’s Central Commission members.288 
Washington State’s approach should be a good model for 
Afghanistan’s Central Board. Similarly, Afghanistan’s Central Board 
should nominate the Provincial Boards’ members to the President, but 
the Provincial Board’s members should also have the same 
qualifications as the Central Board.  After the President ratifies a 
Provincial Board member’s nomination, that member may work 
independently.  This would be different from Iran’s model, where 
regulations sets forth the Provincial Commission’s member selection 
process. 
3. Authority and Responsibility 
Like Washington and Iran’s laws, the ACPA and Pardon Board 
regulations should govern the authority and responsibilities of the 
Pardon Board members.  Generally, the ACPA or Board regulations 
would authorize the Pardon Board to review all pardons or punishment 
reduction requests on special occasions or events.  Under either the 
ACPA or Pardon Board Regulations, the Pardon Board would also 
                                                          
285.  WASH REV. CODE § 9.94A.880 (1974). 
286.  CLEMENCY AND PARDONS BOARD, BYLAWS OF THE WASHINGTON STATE 
CLEMENCY AND PARDONS BOARD, art. 2 § 4 (Mar. 22, 2011). 
287.  2008 Iranian Pardoning Regulation, supra note 9, art. 2. 
288.  Id. arts. 2, 3. 
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consider the particular and specific circumstances that are proper or 
improper to recommend pardons to the President. 
In Iran and Washington, commissions and boards are responsible 
for hearing pardon or punishment reduction petitions at specified time 
periods before recommending them to the authorized person.  
Washington’s board holds its hearings quarterly;289 while Iran’s 
commissions hold their meetings every fifteen days.290  These models 
will be different from the recommendations for Afghanistan, because 
ACPA specifies five events that permit the President to issue pardons 
or punishment reductions.  Therefore, the Pardon Board may hold their 
meetings according to ACPA’s provisions. 
To maintain authority, Pardon Board members must have 
independence.  The President must not have the power to dismiss 
Pardon Board members unless the members commit a crime.  The 
Pardon Board may hear all types of pardon and clemency cases.  
However, Pardon Board members will not receive a salary for their 
services.  Instead, Afghanistan’s government will pay for their 
transportation when they come for regular or special meetings.  This is 
also like the Washington Clemency Board. 
4. The Board’s Pardon Process 
Washington State and Iran are also great models for the Pardon 
Board’s procedures.  Washington State’s Board has a preliminary 
committee within that is responsible to review the petitions before a full 
board hearing.  This design provides Afghanistan with a very important 
model for its own pardon or punishment reduction process. 
Further, by amending Afghanistan’s law to emulate Iran and 
Washington State, any convicted person may have the right to ask for 
pardons or punishment reductions.  Like Washington and Iran’s laws, 
convicted persons must have the right to file a petition requesting for 
either a pardon or punishment reduction.  Like Washington’s approach, 
petitioners should be able submit their petitions to the Pardon Board at 
least one month before the scheduled hearing dates, which are specified 
events under the ACPA.  The Preliminary Committee could review all 
documents and match the pardons or punishment reductions with 
                                                          
289.  Bylaws of Clemency and Pardons Board, supra note 17, art. 3 § 7. 
290.  2008 Iranian Pardoning Regulation, supra note 9, art. 15. 
46
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 49, No. 2 [2019], Art. 3
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol49/iss2/3
Isar camera ready (Do Not Delete) 5/7/2019  10:03 AM 
2019] RE-DEFINING AFGHANISTAN’S PRESIDENTIAL PARDON LAW 343 
conditions or circumstances.  Then, if the petitions meet the conditions 
or at least provide all the necessary documents, the Preliminary 
Committee will recommend the pardons to the entire Pardon Board for 
a hearing.Like Washington’s approach, the board will publicly hold the 
meeting and decide whether to recommend a pardon. 
5. The Possible Challenges 
This approach potentially could face many challenges, including 
concerns about the President and executive officials losing power and 
authority.  President Ghani believes in a strong and powerful central 
government, and he has emphasized this position by criticizing other 
governments and powers.  Therefore, President Ghani will not accept 
any idea that would limit the pardon power.  Corrupt officials also will 
try to prevent regulatory mechanisms on the pardon power because such 
mechanisms will prevent them from engaging in corruption or abusing 
the pardon power.  Moreover, some people will challenge any proposal 
that advocates for individuals to work without a salary.  Finally, 
Afghanistan’s corrupt and unjust judiciary system would either prevent 
or at least hinder any proposal to modify pardon procedures. 
CONCLUSION 
Throughout human history, “pardon and forgiveness” has been 
recognized through religion, custom, social principles, and socio-
political norms.  In the field of legislation, some scholars believe the 
recognition of pardons can be traced from Hammurabi’s Code to the 
laws of the United Kingdom and the United States of America.  In 
Islamic countries, the source of pardon and forgiveness has been tied to 
religious teachings.  The Qur’an explicitly recommends the use of 
pardon and forgiveness.  Although the pardon power has been 
associated with compassion and kindness, this power has been used for 
the social and political interests of rulers, like kings and presidents in 
Afghanistan. 
Over the past eigtheen years, the pardon power has undermined the 
rule of law and has occassionally eradicated judicial systems.  The 
pardon system is necessary in every society, especially in places like 
Afghanistan where there is a corrupt and weak judicial system. 
Therefore, socieites must take into account the legitimate use of 
pardons. 
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Although the Afghanistan Constitution authorizes the President to 
use pardons, he has not been able to regulate this power.  Thus, by 
amending Afghanistan’s Constitution and the ACPA, Afghanistan can 
regulate the presidential pardon power.  The amendments should 
specify the crimes that the President can pardon and create a body that 
examines pardon requests and determines which offenders are ready for 
prison release. 
To improve its pardon process, Afghanistan should establish 
committees and procedures based on Iran and Washington State’s 
model.  Iran and Washington State’s procedures effectively prevent the 
pardon power from being used for corruption.  Without corruption, the 
pardon power cannot undermine Afghanistan’s judicial system.  
Further, an efficient pardon system allows the release of individuals 
who do not need to be in prison anymore, decreasing government 
spending.  Afghanistan can become a more efficient and prosperous 
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